Daily Press Briefing
Statements made by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson
(excerpts)
(Paris, October 13, 2006)
[Please note that only the original French text issued by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs may be considered official.]
(…)
LEBANON
Q - President Chirac and the German chancellor said they’re relatively satisfied with the implementation of UNSCR 1701. In light of repeated violations of Lebanese airspace by Israeli jets, is it France’s official position today that the resolution is being complied with by both parties and the countries in the region?
With regard to the implementation of UNSCR 1559 and 1701, we’re waiting for the UN secretary-general’s reports in a few weeks. We will shortly have a report on the implementation of 1559 and a bit later one on 1701. It will be up to the secretary-general to tell us how he evaluates the implementation of these resolutions.
President Chirac stated his view yesterday during his press conference with Angela Merkel. I’ve nothing to add to what he said then.
With regard to the over-flights, we’ve made our position known several times. We consider these flights a violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. As I’ve said before, we’ve been in contact with the Israelis about them and will continue to do so.
(…)
Q - About Mr. Prodi’s visit to Beirut. We’ve heard a lot of talk about a compromise on Shebaa Farms. Have you been informed of the arrangements?
As we said, it’s part of the parameters in resolution 1701—it’s perfectly clear. It’s one of the important points for moving on from the cessation-of-hostilities phase to a lasting cease-fire and political solution. It’s one of the aspects on which the UN secretary-general is working. He’s had contacts and is continuing to have them. As I've said, he’s to give us a new report in a few weeks. It is for him to say how he sees things and what type of proposal and initiative we might envision. But to my knowledge it is premature to be speaking of an arrangement already.
Q - Is there a French or European position on this? Is there unity in the European position?
We’ve no specific position to take. We know the situation with regard to the UN. There were UN decisions in 2002. Now, we see that it is one of the parameters for a lasting cease-fire and political solution. We are open to formulas that can be accepted by the parties concerned and are adopted by the UN secretary-general. I believe that on the Lebanese side, in the Siniora plan, a number of ideas were put formulated and taken up by the UN secretary-general. We are open to a solution that allows for this question to be resolved through an agreement among the parties concerned and in the context of a settlement proposed by the UN secretary-general. On the French and European side, we don’t need to go beyond that.
Q - If I understood correctly, you said in the past that you supported the Lebanese proposal for putting Shebaa Farms provisionally under international supervision?
That’s one possible approach. It’s not ruled out. On the Lebanese side it was mentioned in Mr. Siniora’s plan. If one considers that it’s a formula that ultimately helps move things forward, we shall not be the ones to oppose it.
Q - It’s been said that Mr. Solana is going to announce at the general affairs/external relations council that the discussions with Iran over.
I did see a wire service report from Brussels that the 25 were going to announce the end of negotiations with Iran. I must say it surprised me. The purpose of Mr. Solana’s contacts with Mr. Larijani was to see how to start real negotiations. Mr. Solana was also due to make a report to the Six. You saw what the Six said after this contact with Solana.
Quite frankly there’ll be no scoop coming out of the meeting of EU foreign ministers on Iran. The situation is what we know. It is that the talks have not led to an agreement and to the start of real negotiations. The Six said that they were going to confer to see how to prepare for measures under Article 41 of the UN Charter. I don’t have anything new, not from Mr. Solana or the 25 about the general affairs council.
Q - Mr. Solana never said it was all over?
No one said it. Mr. Solana didn’t, and the Six have never said it. The 25 won’t. We’re working on measures under Article 41. But obviously if Iran wishes to return to dialogue and negotiation, it will be able to do so. Saying that we’re going to double lock the door to negotiations is not our vision of things.
Q - The Iranian ambassador to France, Mr. Ahani, told the press this week that the negotiations weren’t broken off but going at a slower pace. For Iran, the door remains open. Also Iran rejects what the West is saying about Iran having already produced a quantity of uranium beyond what it needs for civil nuclear energy. It also rejects the accusations that it is developing a ballistic missile capacity beyond its defense needs How would you answer Mr. Ahani?
About your second point. I don’t wish to get into a debate about the quantities produced or not produced. The Security Council and IAEA demanded that Iran comply with its obligations and suspend its enrichment activities. Clearly, Iran has not done so. The Iranians themselves acknowledge this. The question of knowing where they are exactly in their production of material for nuclear purposes and their ballistic missile program is not germane at this time.
With regard to your first point, this goes back to what we were just saying. One can’t say that the negotiations are slowing now since at this point there are no negotiations with Iran. There’s still a possibility of going back to the negotiating table, but we can’t do that for now absent any willingness on the Iranian side.
The consultations are continuing, particularly among the political directors of the Six. There’s broad agreement among the Six that now is the time for the UN Security Council to adopt measures against Iranian nuclear and ballistic programs. That’s what we’re going to be working on very soon in New York.
Obviously it doesn’t mean that the door is closed to negotiations. If the Iranians tell us they’re ready to go back to the negotiating table, ready to suspend their enrichment activities, it’s something that is still possible.
Q - Was there a stumbling block other than that of suspending enrichment? In his statements Mr. Solana has never clearly adopted the French formulation of suspension during the negotiations. It was still a precondition. Does that mean that your proposal wasn’t well received?
What we proposed was simultaneous “double suspension.” We would suspend the procedure in the Security Council, and Iran would suspend its enrichment activities.
Messrs. Solana and Larijani discussed a number of things. There was a stumbling block over the question of suspension. However, as that point was necessary for starting negotiations, none of the rest was really examined in any great detail.
Q - At the UN there’s a lot of talk about divisions between the United States and Japan, which have taken a fairly tough line, and the Chinese and Russians whose position is less firm, but I’ve not heard much about the French proposal on the sanctions to be taken against North Korea.
We are party to these discussions. There have in fact been various proposals by the Americans and by others, and positions have been taken by China and Russia.
Our concern, as we’ve said, is for there to be a swift response and for it to be sufficiently firm vis-à-vis North Korea, that is for there to be a resolution under Chapter 7 of the Charter which includes a whole raft of measures, specifically about North Korea’s military programs and missiles and WMD programs. That was our objective in the discussions, and we’re rather optimistic. We think a consensus is forming in the Security Council on adopting such a resolution. We think this should be reached in the next few days.
Q - One thing struck me in the US proposals; when they speak of “luxury goods” what do they mean?
We have to see if that actually appears in the resolution that’s adopted. The approach in the resolution is to establish a committee, as usual in this type of resolution, that will be tasked with defining more precisely the list of entities concerned, of people and equipment concerned. I confess I’ve not seen a definition of luxury goods but I imagine it’s a way of penalizing those in North Korea who are consumers of luxury goods, i.e. obvious not the majority of the population.
Q - Are these proposals part of the French proposals or American and only Japanese?
They’re part of what’s being discussed in New York. As I said, we’ll have to see if this figures or not in the final project and resolution that’s adopted. Clearly it’s a way of reaching the elite in North Korea.
Q - Some countries think it’s necessary to monitor imports and exports with North Korea, i.e. monitoring flights and having fairly stringent checks on shipping to and from North Korea. Where’s France on this?
Once again, we’ll have to wait and see what’s in the final resolution. I’ll be fairly cautious. In the current draft of the resolution there are measures regarding checks by UN member states on flows to and from North Korea—you understand that all this has to be done in accordance with international law. It is one of the provisions that could be in the resolution.
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Q - What’s North Korea’s status in the NPT? Does it run the risk of being excluded?
North Korea took steps to withdraw from the NPT a few years ago. We take the position that such a unilateral withdrawal is not provided for in the treaty and that a country does not have the option of withdrawing from the NPT unilaterally. To answer your question, the fact of carrying out a test does not mean that North Korea is excluded from the NPT. The NPT is on the contrary a way of maintaining this country within a multilateral framework. The consequences of the nuclear test have to be considered at Security Council level.
Q - Iran is a member of the NPT. The international community accuses it of violating the treaty’s provisions. What retaliatory measure can be considered?
Iran is a party to the NPT, Iran even signed the additional protocol but never ratified it. Iran did decide to implement it then decided to stop. But Iran is in the NPT. So when there are lapses of the NPT or the AIEA safeguards regime these have to be noted and sanctioned. That is done at Security Council level.
Q - But the sanctions aren’t stipulated in the NPT?
The NPT is a framework. It rests on three pillars: non-proliferation, the development of civil nuclear energy and disarmament. Those are the three aspects of the nuclear problem. So it’s a framework and when you have violations, the consequences are drawn at the IAEA or in the Security Council.
Q - Is it correct to say that compliance with the NPT is a challenge for the international community?
The question is really how to enforce compliance with NPT provisions, how eventually to strengthen the NPT. It’s a debate that is emerging at different levels but which hasn’t been concluded. But that is the direction in which people are thinking.
Q - But is there a procedure for pulling out of the treaty…?
It’s a rather complicated problem. The important point is we consider that a country which has signed the NPT does not have the option to withdraw unilaterally. There are discussions among jurists, but our interpretation is that unilateral withdrawal from the NPT is not possible.
Q - Don’t you think the international community has been shaken by the nuclear question now? We’ve seen Pakistan and India. We know Israel has nuclear weapons. Other countries are working on nuclear programs—Iran, North Korea. Wouldn’t now be the time in France’s view, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to start afresh and have another system that would include, for example a denuclearized zone in the Middle East, as you’ve already said you’ wanted, and possibly other provisions?
One doesn’t give up something just because not everyone respects the highway code. Clearly a multilateral framework has to be kept for non-proliferation. The NPT is a very important component in this. And as we said a few days ago, it is probably thanks in part to the NPT that the number of proliferation crises has remained relatively limited.
We are confronted today with two very acute proliferation crises--Iran and North Korea. On the other hand, other countries have renounced the nuclear path on which they were engaged. They gave it up on their own initiative or after a negotiated process.
Globally, I’d say that this contained proliferation and limited it to a few cases. Now it is clear that we undoubtedly have to think about strengthening this regime. We’ve not yet arrived at a conclusion but there are approaches, like the idea of increasing the responsibility of exporting countries, augmenting IAEA verification capabilities by making the additional protocol universal, organizing the international community’s response in the event of violations of commitments, and strengthening the multilateral approach to these questions at the Security Council. These are some of the approaches, but there may be others. Obviously there’s a debate on how to move forward in this area.
Q - Britain’s army chief said this morning that British forces should pull out of Iraq. What’s your reaction?
I’m not going to comment on remarks by the British chief of staff (…)
On the question of foreign troops in Iraq, we’ve stated our position many times over. We consider this is something which depends on the decision of the Iraqi authorities. We consider it is very important for a political process to be put in place which allows Iraq to recover full sovereignty, and of course there needs to be a withdrawal of foreign troops on the horizon. There needs to be the prospect of withdrawal of foreign troops, but it’s not for us to set the date.
Q - You’ve probably seen the latest figures about the number of civilians who have been killed…. Do you have an idea for confirming if these figures are valid…? Second, there are growing calls in the US and Europe for a programmed withdrawal of coalition forces and replacing them with a UN force? What’s your reaction to this proposal?
Regarding your first question, you saw as I did the study that had been done. As I understand it, it raises the question of overstating the deaths, that is how many additional deaths have been directly or indirectly linked to the war in Iraq. It is up to the people who did the study to present it and defend it.
We’ve no particularly estimate as far as we are concerned. We see the present situation with—as the Iraqi authorities themselves are saying—some hundred or so victims a day in attacks, ambushes, in cross fire. That’s the reality as we see it today, and it is very disturbing in itself, independently of the toll which may be established, which is probably very difficult to establish exactly.
With regard to your second point on replacing the coalition forces with a UN force. I’ve not seen that suggestion specifically. I don’t believe the Americans have discussed it with us directly. As I said, we’re not asking for an immediate withdrawal of the coalition troops. There needs to be a horizon, a prospect for withdrawal--that’s always been our position--through a political process. As for the idea of possibly replacing it with a UN force, I’ve no position on the question. I imagine it’s something we would look at very closely. If there were such a such a request, all the consequences would have to be weighed./.
Embassy of France, October 13, 2006