1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Lisbon to chart NATO’s future course. We reaffirm our commitment to the common vision and shared democratic values embodied in the Washington Treaty, and to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on solidarity, Alliance cohesion and the indivisibility of our security, NATO remains the transatlantic framework for strong collective defence and the essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies. NATO’s fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. The Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively, and always in accordance with international law, three essential core tasks – collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security – all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members.
2. We have adopted a new Strategic Concept that lays out our vision for the Alliance for the next decade: able to defend its members against the full range of threats; capable of managing even the most challenging crises; and better able to work with other organizations and nations to promote international stability. NATO will be more agile, more capable and more cost-effective, and it will continue to serve as an essential instrument for peace. In accordance with the detailed provisions of this Declaration, we have also:
decided to enhance NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach to crisis management as part of the international community’s effort and to improve NATO’s ability to deliver stabilization and reconstruction effects;
encouraged the Secretary General to continue to work with the European Union High Representative and to report to the Council on the ongoing efforts in time for the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in April 2011;
invited Russia to deepen its cooperation with us on the areas where we have common interests;
agreed to further enhance our existing partnerships and to develop new ones with interested countries and organizations;
agreed to continue to review NATO’s overall defence and deterrence posture;
agreed that, consistent with the Strategic Concept and their commitments under existing arms control treaties and frameworks, Allies will continue to support arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts;
decided to develop a missile defence capability to protect all NATO European populations, territory and forces, and invited Russia to cooperate with us;
agreed to enhance our cyber defence capabilities;
agreed an Action Plan to mainstream United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security into NATO-led operations and missions;
tasked the development of Political Guidance for the further improvement of our defence capabilities and the military implementation of the new Strategic Concept;
agreed the Lisbon package of the Alliance’s most pressing capability needs;
directed the implementation of a more effective, leaner and affordable Alliance Command Structure, and the consolidation of the NATO Agencies; and
tasked the Secretary General and the Council to take forward the reform process in all necessary areas without delay.
3. We express our profound gratitude for the professionalism, dedication and bravery of the more than 143,000 men and women from Allied and partner nations who are deployed on NATO’s operations and missions. We owe a deep debt of gratitude to all those who have lost their lives or been injured during the course of their duties, and we extend our deepest sympathies to their families and loved ones. We pledge to support our veterans. To further advance this important objective, Allies will share, where beneficial, national best practices and lessons learned.
As expressed in the Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the nations contributing to the UN-mandated, NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, our ISAF mission in Afghanistan remains the Alliance’s key priority, and we welcome the important progress that has been made. Afghanistan’s security and stability are directly linked with our own security. In meeting with President Karzai, all our 21 partners in ISAF, the United Nations, the European Union, the World Bank and Japan, we reaffirm our long-term commitment to Afghanistan, as set out in our strategic vision agreed at the Bucharest Summit and reaffirmed at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit.
We welcome the valuable and increased contributions made by our ISAF partners and would welcome further contributions. We are entering a new phase in our mission. The process of transition to full Afghan security responsibility and leadership in some provinces and districts is on track to begin in early 2011, following a joint Afghan and NATO/ISAF assessment and decision. Transition will be conditions-based, not calendar-driven, and will not equate to withdrawal of ISAF-troops. Looking to the end of 2014, Afghan forces will be assuming full responsibility for security across the whole of Afghanistan. Through our enduring partnership with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, we reaffirm our long-term commitment to a better future for the Afghan people.
5. We remain steadfast in our commitment to regional stability and security throughout the Balkans region. KFOR remains in Kosovo on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 to support a stable, peaceful and multi-ethnic environment, cooperating with all relevant actors, in particular the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), and the Kosovo Police, in accordance with NATO agreed decisions and procedures. We welcome the progress made by the Kosovo Security Force, under NATO’s close supervision, and the Kosovo Police, and commend them for their readiness and growing capability to implement their security tasks and responsibilities.
Reflecting the improving security situation, KFOR is moving towards a smaller, more flexible, deterrent presence. We expect this process of transition to a deterrent posture, implying further troop reductions, to continue as fast as conditions allow, and will keep it under political review. KFOR’s capability to carry out its mission throughout the transition process will be maintained.
6. The Alliance is also contributing to peace and security through other operations and missions:
Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), our Article 5 maritime operation in the Mediterranean, is making a significant contribution to the fight against terrorism.
Operation Ocean Shield off the Horn of Africa demonstrates NATO’s commitment to contribute to the sustained comprehensive international effort to help counter piracy and armed robbery at sea.
At the request of the African Union (AU), we are providing support to its mission in Somalia and the development of its long-term peacekeeping capabilities, including the African Stand-by Force. At the request of the UN Secretary-General, we are also escorting UN-chartered vessels in support of the African Union Mission in Somalia.
The NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) demonstrates the Alliance’s support for the Government and people of Iraq. We stand ready to consider requests for further training. We also stand ready to advance our partnership with Iraq through the Structured Cooperation Framework.
7. We welcome the 10th Anniversary of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. Guided by the Policy that we developed together with our Partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, we have already taken significant steps to implement it and its related Resolutions. We have today endorsed an Action Plan to mainstream the provisions of UNSCR 1325 into our current and future crisis management and operational planning, into Alliance training and doctrine, and into all relevant aspects of the Alliance’s tasks. We are committed to the implementation of this Policy and Action Plan as an integral part of our work to improve the Alliance’s effectiveness, and today we endorsed recommendations to this end. We have tasked the Council to provide a progress report to our Foreign Ministers in December 2011 and at the next Summit.
8. Our operational experience has taught us that military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to our security. Both within and outside the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO must work with other actors to contribute to a comprehensive approach that effectively combines political, civilian and military crisis management instruments. Its effective implementation requires all actors to contribute in a concerted effort, based on a shared sense of responsibility, openness and determination, and taking into account their respective strengths, mandates and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy.
9. A number of important principles and lessons have been identified and these should be taken into account as the Alliance approaches the next phase of development of its contribution to an effective comprehensive approach by the international community. As a general rule, elements of stabilization and reconstruction are best undertaken by those actors and organizations that have the relevant expertise, mandate, and competence. However, there can be circumstances which may hamper other actors from undertaking these tasks, or undertaking them without support from NATO. Based on the detailed political guidance which we have endorsed at this Summit, the Alliance must, therefore, have the ability to plan for, employ, and coordinate civilian as well as military crisis-management capabilities that nations provide for agreed Allied missions. To improve NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach and its ability to contribute, when required, to stabilization and reconstruction, we have agreed to form an appropriate but modest civilian capability to interface more effectively with other actors and conduct appropriate planning in crisis management, as addressed in the political guidance mentioned above. We have also noted the progress achieved in the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan agreed at our 2008 Bucharest Summit, and have tasked the Council to update this Action Plan before Foreign Ministers meet in April 2011.
10. We are committed to strong and productive cooperation between NATO and the United Nations. We welcome the strengthened practical cooperation following the Joint Declaration on UN/NATO Secretariat Cooperation of September 2008. We aim to deepen this practical cooperation and further develop our political dialogue on issues of common interest, including through enhanced liaison, more regular political consultation, and enhanced practical cooperation in managing crises where both organizations are engaged.
11. NATO and the European Union (EU) share common values and strategic interests, and are working side by side in crisis-management operations. We are therefore determined to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership, as agreed by our two organizations. We welcome the recent initiatives from several Allies and the ideas proposed by the Secretary General. Building on these initiatives and on the guidance provided by the new Strategic Concept, we encourage the Secretary General to continue to work with the EU High Representative and to report to the Council on the ongoing efforts in time for the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in April 2011.
12. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is an important regional security organization and a forum for dialogue on issues relevant to Euro-Atlantic security, as demonstrated by the Corfu Process. Encompassing the political/military, economic/environmental, and human dimensions, the OSCE plays an important role in promoting security and cooperation. We aim to further enhance the Alliance’s cooperation with the OSCE, both at the political and operational level, in particular in areas such as conflict prevention and resolution, post-conflict rehabilitation, and in addressing new security threats. As we celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Paris Charter, we look forward to the OSCE Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on 1-2 December 2010.
13. In accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, NATO’s door will remain open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, which are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty, and whose inclusion can contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.
14. We reiterate the agreement at our 2008 Bucharest Summit to extend an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name) as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached within the framework of the UN, and urge intensified efforts towards that end. We will continue to support and assist the reform efforts of the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We welcome the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s increased contribution to ISAF.
15. In the strategically important Western Balkans region, democratic values, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations are important for lasting peace and stability. We will continue to actively support Euro-Atlantic aspirations in this region.
16. We welcome the considerable progress that Montenegro has made on its road to Euro-Atlantic integration and its contribution to security in the region and beyond, including through its participation in ISAF. Its active engagement in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process demonstrates Montenegro’s firm commitment to join the Alliance. We look forward to the successful implementation of its first Annual National Programme and will continue, through the MAP, to support Montenegro’s continuing efforts to reform.
17. We fully support the membership aspiration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We welcome the orderly conduct of elections in October 2010; progress on reform; its ongoing efforts to destroy surplus arms and munitions; and its contribution to international security, including through its new ISAF commitment. In accordance with the Statement by our Foreign Ministers in December 2009, we encourage Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political leaders to work together to re-double their efforts to improve further the efficiency and self-reliance of State-level institutions and to advance essential reform priorities. We reaffirm the decision taken by NATO Foreign Ministers in Tallinn in April 2010 to invite Bosnia and Herzegovina to join the Membership Action Plan, authorizing the Council to accept Bosnia and Herzegovina’s first Annual National Programme under the MAP only when all immovable defence properties identified as necessary for future defence purposes have been officially registered as the State property of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for use by the country’s Ministry of Defence. The Alliance would welcome Bosnia and Herzegovina accelerating the process of achieving its Euro-Atlantic aspiration. For our part, we will continue to provide technical assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s reform efforts, including to aid necessary progress for commencing MAP.
18. We welcome, and continue to support, the Government of Serbia’s stated commitment to Serbia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. We welcome the increasing cooperation between NATO and Serbia. We reiterate our openness to Serbia’s further aspirations, including taking advantage of NATO’s partnership opportunities for political consultation and practical cooperation. We call upon Serbia to maintain its efforts with a view to fully cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in order to achieve additional positive results, the most critical issue being the arrest of the remaining fugitives, and their transfer to the ICTY.
19. We call upon Serbia to support further efforts towards the consolidation of peace and stability in Kosovo. We urge both to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by the European Union-facilitated dialogue between them, which was welcomed in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 9 September 2010 as a contribution towards peace, security and stability in the region. We encourage progress in consolidating the rule of law. We welcome progress and encourage further efforts to protect ethnic minorities and communities, as well as historical and religious sites in Kosovo.
20. Stability and successful political and economic reform in Georgia and Ukraine are important to Euro-Atlantic security. We will continue and develop the partnerships with these countries taking into account the Euro-Atlantic aspiration or orientation of each of the countries.
21. At the 2008 Bucharest Summit we agreed that Georgia will become a member of NATO and we reaffirm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions. We will foster political dialogue and practical cooperation with Georgia, including through the NATO-Georgia Commission and the Annual National Programme. We strongly encourage and actively support Georgia’s continued implementation of all necessary reforms, particularly democratic, electoral and judicial reforms, as well as security and defence sector reforms, in order to advance its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. We welcome the recent opening of the NATO Liaison Office in Georgia which will help in maximizing our assistance and support for the country’s reform efforts. We welcome Georgia’s important contributions to NATO operations, in particular to ISAF. We reiterate our continued support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders. We encourage all participants in the Geneva talks to play a constructive role as well as to continue working closely with the OSCE, UN and the EU to pursue peaceful conflict resolution in the internationally-recognized territory of Georgia. We continue to call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as independent States.
22. A stable, democratic and economically prosperous Ukraine is an important factor for Euro-Atlantic security. Recognizing the sovereign right of each nation to freely choose its security arrangements, we respect Ukraine’s policy of “non-bloc” status. NATO remains committed to providing the relevant assistance to Ukraine for the implementation of wide-ranging domestic reforms. We welcome the Ukrainian Government’s commitment to continue to pursue fully Ukraine’s Distinctive Partnership with NATO, including through high-level political dialogue in the NATO-Ukraine Commission, and reform and practical cooperation through the Annual National Programme, and in this context, we recall that NATO’s door remains open, as stated in the Bucharest Summit decision. We remain convinced that mutually beneficial cooperation between NATO and Ukraine will continue to be of key importance for peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond, and appreciate the constructive role Ukraine plays in this respect, including through its participation in NATO-led operations. We welcome Ukraine’s interest in developing new areas of cooperation.
23. NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance, as reflected by today’s meeting of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) at the level of Heads of State and Government in Lisbon. In light of common security interests, we are determined to build a lasting and inclusive peace, together with Russia, in the Euro-Atlantic Area. We need to share responsibility in facing up to common challenges, jointly identified. We want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia.
We recommit ourselves to the goals, principles and commitments which underpin the NRC. On this firm basis, we urge Russia to meet its commitments with respect to Georgia, as mediated by the European Union on 12 August and 8 September 2008 (as complemented by President Sarkozy’s letter dated 16 August 2008 and subsequent correspondence on this issue). Over the past year, NATO-Russia cooperation has progressed and produced notable results. We welcome, in particular, the completion of the Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges, which has identified practical cooperation projects on Afghanistan, including counter-narcotics; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; counter-piracy; counter-terrorism; and disaster response.
We also welcome the new extended arrangements offered by Russia to facilitate ISAF transit to and from Afghanistan. We are actively pursuing cooperation with Russia on missile defence, including through the resumption of theatre missile defence exercises. We will also want to discuss in the NRC a range of other topics, including Afghanistan; implementing OSCE principles; military deployments, including any that could be perceived as threatening; information sharing and transparency on military doctrine and posture, as well as the overall disparity in short-range nuclear weapons; arms control; and other security issues. We look forward to discussing all these matters in the NRC, which is a forum for political dialogue at all times and on all issues, including where we disagree. Our dialogue and cooperation with Russia also help us to resolve differences by building trust, mutual confidence, transparency, predictability and mutual understanding.
24. Partnerships enhance Euro-Atlantic and wider international security and stability; can provide frameworks for political dialogue and regional cooperation in the field of security and defence; contribute to strengthening our common values; and are essential to the success of many of our operations and missions. They enable us to share expertise; support broader reform; promote transparency, accountability and integrity in the defence sector; train and assist our partners in developing their own capabilities; and prepare interested nations for membership in NATO. They are also important in addressing emerging, and continuing, trans-national challenges such as proliferation, terrorism, maritime-, cyber- and energy security.
25. We remain committed to further developing political dialogue and practical cooperation with our partners. In doing so, we will carry forward the important achievements of NATO’s partnerships policy and continue to respect the specificity of our existing multilateral partnerships:
The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) are central to our vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace. We reiterate our commitment to further develop the EAPC/PfP as the essential framework for substantive political dialogue and practical cooperation, including enhanced military interoperability, and will continue to develop policy initiatives;
Peace and stability in the Mediterranean region are essential for Euro-Atlantic security. We intend to further develop the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) by raising its political and practical dimensions, in order to build mutual confidence and to deal together with the common security challenges in this region;
We welcome the progress achieved in the framework of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) since its establishment in 2004. NATO and ICI countries have intensified political consultations and enhanced practical cooperation in various areas. We look forward to working with ICI partners with a view to further developing and strengthening this Initiative; and
NATO’s relationships with other partners across the globe are expanding and deepening, reflecting common goals in the area of security.
26. NATO’s partnership mechanisms have evolved substantially over the past 20 years and they, like NATO itself, would benefit from a focused reform effort to make our dialogue and cooperation more meaningful, and to enhance the strategic orientation of our cooperation through a better assessment of the cooperation activities conducted with partners. To this end, we will:
streamline NATO’s partnership tools in order to open all cooperative activities and exercises to our partners and to harmonize our partnership programmes;
better engage with our partners across the globe who contribute significantly to security, and reach out to relevant partners to build trust, increase transparency and develop practical cooperation;
develop flexible formats to discuss security challenges with our partners and enhance existing fora for political dialogue; and
build on improvements in NATO’s training mechanisms (including the NATO Training Cooperation Initiative) and consider methods to enhance individual partners’ ability to build capacity.
27. We have tasked the Council to develop a more efficient and flexible partnership policy for the April 2011 Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Berlin, while continuing to implement agreed measures expeditiously. We will consult with all interested partners on the development and implementation of this policy to ensure their full ownership.
28. We greatly value the contributions made by partner countries to our operations and missions. These contributions demonstrate our partners’ commitment, alongside NATO, to promote international security and stability. We have today tasked the Council to consult with partners and, building on lessons learned and reinforcing the habit of cooperation established through KFOR and ISAF, to review the Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP Operations, in order to update how we work together and shape decisions with partner countries on the operations and missions to which they contribute; this work should be completed in time for the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in June 2011, with a progress report for Foreign Ministers in April 2011.
29. Security and stability in the Black Sea region continue to be important for Euro-Atlantic security. We welcome the progress in consolidating regional cooperation and ownership, through effective use of existing initiatives and mechanisms, based on transparency, complementarity and inclusiveness. We encourage these efforts and stand ready to support them, as appropriate, based on regional priorities and dialogue and cooperation among the Black Sea countries and with the Alliance.
30. Our Strategic Concept underscores our commitment to ensuring that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety of our populations and the security of our territory. To that end, NATO will maintain an appropriate mix of conventional, nuclear, and missile defence forces. Missile defence will become an integral part of our overall defence posture. Our goal is to bolster deterrence as a core element of our collective defence and contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance. We have tasked the Council to continue to review NATO’s overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account changes in the evolving international security environment. This comprehensive review should be undertaken by all Allies on the basis of deterrence and defence posture principles agreed in the Strategic Concept, taking into account WMD and ballistic missile proliferation. Essential elements of the review would include the range of NATO’s strategic capabilities required, including NATO’s nuclear posture, and missile defence and other means of strategic deterrence and defence. This only applies to nuclear weapons assigned to NATO.
31. Consistent with the Strategic Concept and their commitments under existing arms control treaties and frameworks, Allies will continue to support arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. We are resolved to seek a safer world for all and create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goal of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We welcome the conclusion of the New START Treaty and look forward to its early ratification and entry into force.
With the changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, we have dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and our reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We will seek to create the conditions for further reductions in the future. We are committed to conventional arms control, which provides predictability, transparency, and a means to keep armaments at the lowest possible level for security. We will work to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe on the basis of reciprocity, transparency, and host nation consent. In order to maintain, and develop further, appropriate consultations among Allies on these issues, we task the Council to establish a Committee to provide advice on WMD control and disarmament in the context of the review above, taking into account the role of the High Level Task Force (HLTF).
32. The Alliance reaffirms its continued commitment to the CFE Treaty Regime with all its elements. Although agreement has not yet been reached on how to strengthen and modernize the arms control regime for the 21st Century, we welcome progress to date and encourage the 36 participating nations, on an equal footing, including all Allies and CFE States Parties, to redouble efforts to conclude a principles-based framework to guide negotiations in 2011. Building on the CFE Treaty of 1990, the Agreement on Adaptation of 1999, and existing political commitments, our goal would be to take a significant step toward ensuring the continued viability of conventional arms control in Europe and strengthening our common security. We look forward to making concrete progress towards this end this year. The results of our work in the coming weeks and months will guide our future decisions on continued implementation of CFE obligations, given that, as we said at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, the current situation, where NATO CFE Allies implement the Treaty while Russia does not, cannot continue indefinitely.
33. We continue to be concerned about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). We recall our Declaration at Strasbourg/Kehl and the United Nations Security Council’s serious concern with Iran’s nuclear programme, and call upon Iran to comply fully and without delay with all relevant UNSCRs. In this context, we welcome the resumption of talks between the P5+1 and Iran. We are also deeply concerned by the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and call on it to comply fully with UNSCRs 1718 and 1847, and relevant international obligations.
34. We call for universal adherence to, and compliance with, the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to the additional protocol to the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguard Agreement, and call for full implementation of UNSCR 1540. We will continue to implement NATO’s Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threats. We task the Council to assess and report, before the meeting of Defence Ministers in June 2011, on how NATO can better counter the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.
35. With our vision of a Euro-Atlantic area at peace, the persistence of protracted regional conflicts in South Caucasus and the Republic of Moldova continues to be a matter of great concern for the Alliance. We urge all parties to engage constructively and with reinforced political will in peaceful conflict resolution, and to respect the current negotiation formats. We call on them all to avoid steps that undermine regional security and stability. We remain committed in our support of the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, and will also continue to support efforts towards a peaceful settlement of these regional conflicts, taking into account these principles.
36. The threat to NATO European populations, territory and forces posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles is increasing. As missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat, we have decided that the Alliance will develop a missile defence capability to pursue its core task of collective defence. The aim of a NATO missile defence capability is to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, based on the principles of the indivisibility of Allied security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable challenge, taking into account the level of threat, affordability and technical feasibility, and in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance.
37. To this end, we have decided that the scope of NATO’s current Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme’s command, control and communications capabilities will be expanded beyond the protection of NATO deployed forces to also protect NATO European populations, territory and forces. In this context, the United States European Phased Adaptive Approach is welcomed as a valuable national contribution to the NATO missile defence architecture, as are other possible voluntary contributions by Allies. We have tasked the Council to develop missile defence consultation, command and control arrangements by the time of the March 2011 meeting of our Defence Ministers. We have also tasked the Council to draft an action plan addressing steps to implement the missile defence capability by the time of the June 2011 Defence Ministers’ meeting.
38. We will continue to explore opportunities for missile defence cooperation with Russia in a spirit of reciprocity, maximum transparency and mutual confidence. We reaffirm the Alliance’s readiness to invite Russia to explore jointly the potential for linking current and planned missile defence systems at an appropriate time in mutually beneficial ways. NATO missile defence efforts and the United States European Phased Adaptive Approach provide enhanced possibilities to do this. We are also prepared to engage with other relevant States, on a case-by-case basis, to enhance transparency and confidence and to increase missile defence mission effectiveness.
39. Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and transnational illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people. Terrorism in particular poses a real and serious threat to the security and safety of the Alliance and its members. All acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable, irrespective of their motivations or manifestations. We will continue to fight this scourge, individually and collectively, in accordance with international law and the principles of the UN Charter. In accordance with the Strategic Concept, we will continue to enhance both the political and the military aspects of NATO’s contribution to deter, defend, disrupt and protect against this threat including through advanced technologies and greater information and intelligence sharing. We reiterate our continued commitment to dialogue and practical cooperation with our partners in this important area. We deplore all loss of life and extend our sympathies to the victims of terrorism. What they suffer is a visible demonstration of the evil of terrorism and should help mobilize civil society against it.
40. Cyber threats are rapidly increasing and evolving in sophistication. In order to ensure NATO’s permanent and unfettered access to cyberspace and integrity of its critical systems, we will take into account the cyber dimension of modern conflicts in NATO’s doctrine and improve its capabilities to detect, assess, prevent, defend and recover in case of a cyber attack against systems of critical importance to the Alliance. We will strive in particular to accelerate NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) to Full Operational Capability (FOC) by 2012 and the bringing of all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection. We will use NATO’s defence planning processes in order to promote the development of Allies’ cyber defence capabilities, to assist individual Allies upon request, and to optimize information sharing, collaboration and interoperability. To address the security risks emanating from cyberspace, we will work closely with other actors, such as the UN and the EU, as agreed. We have tasked the Council to develop, drawing notably on existing international structures and on the basis of a review of our current policy, a NATO in-depth cyber defence policy by June 2011 and to prepare an action plan for its implementation.
41. A stable and reliable energy supply, diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks, remain of critical importance. The Alliance will continue to consult on the most immediate risks in the field of energy security in accordance with decisions at previous Summits and in line with our new Strategic Concept. We will further develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, concentrating on areas, agreed at Bucharest, where NATO can add value. In advancing our work, we will enhance consultations and cooperation with partners and other international actors, as agreed, and integrate, as appropriate, energy security considerations in NATO’s policies and activities. We task the Council to prepare an interim report on the progress achieved in the area of energy security for the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in December 2011, and a further report for consideration at our next Summit.
42. Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.
43. Having adopted a new Strategic Concept, we have tasked the Council to develop Political Guidance for the continuing transformation of our defence capabilities and forces and the military implementation of our new Strategic Concept for approval by Defence Ministers at their meeting in March 2011.
44. We reaffirm our resolve to continue to provide the resources, including the forces and capabilities required to perform the full range of Alliance missions. Particularly in light of these difficult economic times, we must exercise the utmost financial responsibility over defence spending. We are determined to pursue reform and defence transformation and continue to make our forces more deployable, sustainable, interoperable, and thus more usable. We will ensure that the Alliance is effective and efficient. In this context, we welcome the outcome of the France-United Kingdom Summit on 2 November 2010 which will reinforce their security and defence cooperation by introducing innovative methods of pooling and sharing. We believe that such bilateral reinforcements of European capabilities will contribute to NATO’s overall capabilities.
45. We have endorsed the Lisbon package of the Alliance’s most pressing capability needs and thereby provided a renewed focus and mandate to ensure these critical capabilities are delivered within agreed budgetary ceilings and in accordance with the Alliance’s defence planning process. The Lisbon package will help the Alliance to:
Meet the demands of ongoing operations – including through developing further capabilities to counter improvised explosive devices, and the greater use of collective logistics for medical support and other operational requirements.
Face current, evolving and emerging challenges – including through expanding the current theatre missile defence programme, and defending against cyber attacks.
Acquire key enabling capabilities – including information systems for more effective decision-making and command and control, and improved arrangements for sharing intelligence.
46. We have tasked the Council, in time for the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in March 2011, to conduct further conceptual work on multinational approaches and other innovative ways of cost-effective capability development. We welcome cooperation with the EU, as agreed. Together, and avoiding unnecessary duplication, we will continue to address common shortfalls, which include the areas of countering improvised explosive devices, providing medical support and increasing the availability of heavy-lift helicopters.
47. The NATO Response Force (NRF) provides a rapidly deployable, credible force for collective defence and crisis operations, as well as a visible assurance to all Allies of NATO’s cohesion and commitment to deterrence and collective defence, including through planning, training and exercises. We welcome the more flexible structure adopted for the NRF, which continues to be a vehicle for pursuing transformation and capability development for NATO and nations.
48. The essential core tasks identified in our new Strategic Concept will require that we continue to adapt our Alliance. This calls for an ambitious and coherent package of reform measures, building upon those already introduced, including review of the NATO Command Structure and Agencies Reform, comprehensive Resource Management Reform, and Headquarters Reform, which should also take into consideration the move into the new Headquarters building. We underline our strong support for the Secretary General’s initiatives to streamline NATO’s civilian and military structures and to improve the management of NATO’s resources.
49. We have agreed a framework for a new NATO Command Structure, which will be more effective, leaner and affordable. It will also be more agile, flexible, and better able to deploy on operations, including Article 5 contingencies and providing visible assurance. The new structure represents a significant reduction in the number of headquarters and a manpower saving of 35%, representing almost 5,000 posts, or more, if and where possible. It will have a new relationship with our national headquarters, and will also ensure a regional focus. A final decision on a new NATO Command Structure, including its geographic footprint, will be taken no later than June 2011, and we have tasked the Secretary General to prepare proposals to this end.
50. For the NATO Headquarters, we welcomed progress towards a structure and organization which can best deliver informed timely advice for our consensual decision-making. We welcome the reform of intelligence support, and the Secretary General’s initiative on emerging security challenges. His review of personnel requirements will also be key in achieving demonstrable increased effectiveness, efficiency and savings. In the coming months, we look forward to further improvements, including co-location of military and civilian staff wherever possible, on a functional basis, to achieve more coherent advice to shape Alliance decisions.
51. NATO’s Agencies are making a valuable contribution to addressing the Alliance’s most pressing capability needs. We have approved the consolidation and rationalization of the functions and programmes of the NATO Agencies into three Agencies, and task the Council to prepare a plan for implementing this reform, with a view to achieving improved governance, demonstrable increased effectiveness, efficiency and savings, focusing on outputs, taking into account the specific needs of multinational programmes, for approval by Defence Ministers in March 2011. The plan should include a quantified target for savings, while preserving capability and service delivery, in particular support to operations. Agreed proposals should then be swiftly implemented. A decision on the recommended major geographic footprints (including location of the Agencies’ Headquarters) will be presented to Defence Ministers at the March 2011 Ministerial, with the finalized geographic footprints presented for decision by the June 2011 Ministerial.
52. Resource reform will underpin our broader transformation efforts. As responsible and reliable Allies, we are committed to reforming the way in which NATO’s common funded resources are managed. Accordingly, we welcome progress in this area. The implementation of improved financial management, accountability and oversight is an essential element of comprehensive resource management reform. This ensures a clear proactive and continuous process to balance resources and requirements in order to sustain more efficiently the Alliance’s integrated structures, support our commitment to operations, and deliver our highest strategic priorities.
53. We task the Secretary General and the Council to take forward the reform process in all necessary areas without delay, including the implementation of: Reviews of the Agencies and NATO Command Structure; comprehensive Resource Management Reform;
Headquarters Reform, including the new Headquarters project; and an end-to-end rationalization review of all structures engaged in NATO capability development. We further task the Council to report back to Defence Ministers by March 2011 and subsequent Defence Ministers’ meetings, on progress on this package of measures and possible additional steps necessary to ensure an Alliance capable of delivering on our new Strategic Concept.
54. We express our appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to us by the Government of Portugal. At our meeting in Lisbon, we have set a clear course for NATO’s next decade. NATO will remain an essential source of stability in an uncertain and unpredictable world. With its new Strategic Concept, NATO will be more effective, more engaged, more efficient, and better able to address the 21st century security challenges. We willl meet again in the United States in 2012 to review progress./.